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Abstract
The role of certifiers is to test products for quality, and to communicate the test
results to the market. We construct a free-entry model of certification, where each
certifier chooses a test standard and a price for certification. In equilibrium, certifiers
diﬀerentiate their test standards, and attract diﬀerent segments of the market. The
price for having certified a high-quality product is higher than the price for having
certified a low-quality product, and the net gain from being certified increases in
product quality. We test and find support for these predictions in the market for
MBA education, and also discuss how to apply the model to questions of regulation
and minimum quality standards.
1 Introduction
It is well known that asymmetries of information can hinder trade that otherwise would
be beneficial for all trading parties. To oﬀset negative eﬀects from asymmetries of in-
formation, diﬀerent institutions can emerge. One example is warranties; if contracts can
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be written such that sellers of low-quality products are punished, such ’lemons’ will sub-
tracted from the market, and a more eﬃcient level of trade can be realized. A diﬀerent
institution that can faciliate trade, particularly when contracts are diﬃcult to write or to
enforce, due to e.g., limited liability, is certification. Certifiers are third parties in the trad-
ing process with the ability to separate lemons from non-lemons before trade takes place.
Certifiers, equipped with such assessment abilities, and a reputation for truth-telling, can
make a business by refusing to certify lemons.
The real world abounds with examples of institutions that has certification as the main
function, or an important function. For example, auditors assess whether the accounting
practices of firms comply with GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles), invest-
ment banks evaluate the quality of firms that want to raise capital, credit ranking agencies
assess the credit-worthiness of firms, scientific journals accept or reject papers based on
assessments of scientific quality, and universities admit and grade students according to
their academic achievement and potential.
A common characteristic of certification markets is that diﬀerent certifiers serve diﬀer-
ent segments of the market. For example, it is well known from the auditing industry that
the ’Big 5’ mainly attract high quality firms. Journals of higher rank generally publish
papers of higher quality than lower rank journals, and top-ranked universities admit entry
and award degrees to students of higher average ability than universities of lower rank.
The segmentation in certifying markets implies that the value of a certificate can
be highly dependent on which certifier issued it: A firm’s value will be higher if Arthur
Andersen finds its accounting practices in line with GAAP than if some provincial auditing
firm had formed the same conclusion, the value of a publication in Econometrica is higher
than the value of a publication in lower-ranked journals, a student’s job market prospects
is better if he receives an MBA degree from Harvard than from most other universities,
and, for marine vessels, a certificate from Lloyds or Veritas is a stronger indication of high
quality (e.g., low risk of making environmental damage) than a certificate from one of the
smaller agencies.
The purpose of the paper is to propose a theory of certification with multiple certifiers,
where diﬀerent certifiers capture diﬀerent segments of the market in equilibrium. We wish
to develop the implications for price setting and for surplus division of this theory, and
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to confront these implications with data. Finally, we wish to discuss how the theory can
be applied to issues of public policy.
In the stylized model, there are three types of agents; sellers, buyers, and certifiers.
Initially, only sellers know product quality. Certifiers decide whether to enter the market,
and if they do, choose which segment of the market to target their (costly) test for, and
a price to charge for testing. Test targeting takes the form of test specialization. One
possible test specialization is to build expertise on separating high quality products, and
a diﬀerent possible specialization is to build expertise on separating low quality products.
Specifically, each certifier chooses a cutoﬀ, enabling it to distinguish objects to the left
of the cutoﬀ from objects to the right of the cutoﬀ. Sellers then decide whether to be
certified, and which certifier to attend to. Tests are then performed, the test results made
public, and finally buyers bid for all objects conditional on the test results.
The equilibrium we focus on has several attractive properties. First, certifiers oﬀer
diﬀerentiated tests; some certifiers attempt to attract high-quality sellers, by setting a
high cutoﬀ, while other certifiers attempt to attract low-quality sellers, by setting a low
cutoﬀ. Correspondingly, high (low) quality sellers will attend to the high (low) cutoﬀ
certifiers. Second, the prices charged for certification (one for each certifier) is increasing
in the location of a certifier: if a certifier oﬀers a test with a higher cutoﬀ than another
certifier, the first certifier will charge a higher price for certification than the other certifier
in equilibrium. The intuition for this result is that sellers at the high-end of the quality
scale are willing to pay more to be certified than sellers at the low end of the quality
scale. Third, the distribution of certifiers in equilibrium will be asymmetric; there will
be a higher frequency of certifiers in the high-quality end of the market than in the low
quality end. Also this result reflects the fact that there is higher willingness to pay for
being certified in the high end of the market. Fourth, the net surplus from being certified,
taking into account both the cost and the value added from certification, increases in
the true value of a seller’s object. This result follows from a type of reasoning common
in models of signaling; a higher type can mimic a lower type and get at least as high
payoﬀ in equilibrium. This result points to an intimate relation between certification and
signaling, a relation that will be commented upon further in the text.
While the result on the asymmetry in the distribution of certifiers rests upon as-
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sumptions made on cost structure and upon distributional assumptions, the second (price
monotonicity) and the third property (net surplus monotonicity) of equilibrium are in-
dependent of such assumptions. They are therefore natural candidates for testing of
the theory. We perform such a test of the theory with data from the market for MBA
education.
The free entry assumption of the model ensures that all certifiers will make zero profits.
Moreover, the constructed equilibrium has the feature that seller surplus will be low, and
hence total welfare will tend to be low. In the extension of this negative result, we discuss
the role of public policy that aims at restricting the number of active certifiers in the
market.
An early paper, Laﬀont (1975), considers the possibility that third parties can mitigate
lemons problems, but in a non-strategic setting. Laﬀont (1975) also introduces the possi-
bility that such experts may harm welfare, for the same type of reason as in the present
paper. More closely related is the literature on strategic certification.1 Biglaiser (1993)
considers a setting where products are either of low or of high quality, and discusses the
incentive to become a (monopoly) certifier in such a market. However, in Biglaiser (1993)
there is no threat of entry, and moreover there is no choice over test standard. Lizzeri
(1999) focuses on a setting with a monopoly certifier, who can test products perfectly,
without any cost, and without a threat of entry. The main result is that such a certifier
maximizes profits by revealing as little information as possible about the objects that are
certified. As we shall see later, we can obtain the same type of non-revelation result in
our setting, but only in a special case.
The plan of the paper goes as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model. In Section
3, we derive the main results on market structure. In Section 4 we test the two main
hypotheses of the paper with data from the MBA market, and in Section 5 we discuss
1Broecker (1990) considers an adverse selection model of a credit market, where fund-raising en-
trepeneurs shop banks to get the best deal. Before oﬀering a loan, banks test entrepeneurs for credit-
worthiness. However, the result of the test is not made public in the market, and neither are tests
diﬀerentiated.
In the literature on disclosure of private information, starting with Grossman (1981), it is assumed that
the trading parties can make verifiable statements about product quality while, in contrast, we focus on
the incentives to acquire verifiable statements through intermediaries, and the endogenous informational
content of these statements.
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welfare and public policy issues. Section 6 concludes. Some proofs are relegated to
Appendices A and B.
2 The Model
There are three types of agents; sellers, buyers, and certifiers. Each seller is endowed
with an object of value x to each buyer, where x ∈ [0, 1]. Each seller has valuation 0 of
his object. The distribution of objects follows the (diﬀerentiable) cumulative frequency
function G(x), which is assumed to have uniform density g(x) = 1. Each seller knows the
value of his object to the buyers, but absent of any information the buyers are ignorant
about x, except knowing G(x).
Certifiers test objects and get information about their value. We assume that each
certifier sets a cutoﬀ Ik ∈ <, which makes it able to (perfectly) distinguish objects with
value x less than Ik from objects with value x greater than Ik.2 Later, we consider the
possibility of noisy tests. For simplicity, we let the cost of certification consist of a fixed
cost F > 0 for rigging the test, and marginal cost equal to zero. Later, we will discuss
the impact made by these assumptions.
There are N ex-ante identical certifiers that can enter the market, where N is large.
It is convenient to separate entry into two stages, stage 1 and stage 2. At stage 1, n
certifiers enter the market sequentially, incur the fixed cost F each, and fix an Ik and a
price to charge for certification Pk, where k ∈ {1, .., n}.3 At stage 2, potential entrants
(of which there are many) observe the sequences {Ik} and {Pk}, and decide whether to
enter or not. If the first potential entrant decides to go into the market, it chooses a cutoﬀ
and a price, which is observed by the next potential entrant, which then decides whether
to enter, and so on. At stage 3, sellers observe {Ik} and {Pk}, and choose whether to
2The assumption that each certifier sets one cutoﬀ each seems to be a good approximation to what
goes on in several important certifying markets, as the market for auditing reports, MBA degrees, driving
licenses, and marine vessel certification, since the test results of each certifier in these markets are typically
of a simple binary character (GAAP standard or not, admit or not, fail or pass). The test structure needs
to be modified to fit the reports given by investment banks and for credit ranking agencies (like Moody’s),
whose reports are somewhat more elaborate. A question we do not pursue is why certifier reports typically
only reveal such coarse information. Perhaps one explanation is that a finer information structure makes
cheating on one’s reputation too lucrative.
3Certifers are assumed to being unable to charge a price conditional on the test result.
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be certified or not, and which certifier to attend to. At stage 4, tests are performed and
the results made public. At stage 5, the buyers engage in a first-price sealed-bid auction
over the objects (mimicking a competitive market). The equilibrium notion is sequential
equilibrium.
3 Results
In this section, we first derive the equilibrium we focus on, and then discuss the robustness
and uniqueness properties of the equilibrium.
3.1 Equilibrium
Let n be the equilibrium number of active certifiers. Label the cutoﬀs chosen in equilib-
rium such that I1 ≤ ... ≤ Ik ≤ ... ≤ In, and denote the cutoﬀ set by the certifier of rank
k by Ik , and its price for certification by Pk. Furthermore, let byc be the integer closest
to y from below, where y ∈ <. We then have the following.
Proposition 1 There is an equilibrium with the following properties:
• The number of entering certifiers equals
¹
1
2F
º
.
• I1 < ... < Ik < ... < In.
• The price a certifier charges for certification is increasing in his rank k.
• The frequency of certifiers is increasing along the unit interval.
Proof. We prove the result assuming that
1
2F
∈ {1, 2, 3, ...}, and consider the general
case in Appendix A. First notice that if certifier k attracts the sellers on the interval
[ak, bk] and charges price Pk, his profits are,
Πk(Ik, Pk; ., .) = Pk(bk − ak)− F(1)
For the proposed equilibrium, begin with the certifier at the top end of the scale, and
denote his strategy for (In, Pn). Suppose that for a given In, the top certifier sets Pn =
6
(In + 1)
2
, and attracts all the sellers on the interval [In, 1]. Since there is a threat of
entry, it is necessary for equilibrium that this certifier make profit equal to zero, which
implies that In =
√
1− 2F . Now move on to certifier n − 1. By the same argument,
it can be seen that setting In−1 =
√
1− 4F and take all the seller’s surplus, by setting
Pn−1 =
(In−1 + In)
2
, yields zero profits. In this manner, we generate the sequence with
typical element Ik =
p
1− 2(n+ 1− k)F , where k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, which by using n = 1
2F
simplifies to
Ik =
√
2F
√
k − 1.(2)
The end of the sequence occurs for the certifier who sets I1 =
r
1− 2F
2F
= 0. All sellers
make zero surplus. Substituting (2) into Pk =
(Ik + Ik+1)
2
, we obtain
Pk =
p
2F (k − 1) +√2Fk
2
.(3)
From (3), it follows that prices are increasing in the rank of the certifier. To show that
the frequency of certifiers is increasing along the unit line follows from (2). It follows
from the construction that all entering certifiers make zero profits. The beliefs of the
sellers that support the equilibrium is that by choosing not to be certified, or by failing to
pass a certification test, buyers will think they are of the worst possible type (0). Given
these beliefs, which are not contradicted along the equilibrium path, the sellers (weakly)
prefer to be certified at the certifier with the cutoﬀ closest to the left of the value of their
product. The beliefs of the entering certifiers that support the equilibrium(which is not
contradicted on the equilibrium path) is that by following the equilibrium strategy there
will be no entry, and hence zero profits, while by deviating to attempt to make positive
profits, there will be entry of one of the potential entrants ensuring negative profits for the
deviant. We now construct sequentially rational strategies for the potential entrants that
is consistent with those beliefs. Suppose that entrant i plays the following entry strategy:
enter if and only if one of the existing certifiers (including those that may have entered
before at stage 3) make a positive profit (it is easy to verify that if this condition holds, the
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entrant can make non-negative profits from entering). More specifically, suppose that the
certifier making a positive profit is the deviator from the proposed equilibrium. Denote
the cutoﬀ of the certifier that makes a profit, the deviator, by ID and its price by PD,
and the corresponding choice for the entrant for IE and PE . Furthermore suppose that
the first entrant sets IE = ID and PE = PD − δ, where δ > 0 is set to ensure zero profits
for the entrant. Since nobody makes positive profits after the entry of the first entrant,
there will be no more entry, given that the proposed strategy is played. Moreover, it is
simple to check that the deviator must make a negative profit. Hence under the proposed
equilibrium strategy, and beliefs about oﬀ-equilibrium path behavior of entrants, none
of the n certifiers that enter at stage 2 will have an incentive to deviate. Now consider
deviation by one of the potential entrants. Clearly a deviation that ensures negative
profits makes no sense, since there will be no additional entry. Now consider a deviation
that gives positive profits. Analogously to the case above, after a deviation that gives
positive profits to the entrant, there will be entry of the next potential entrant, and then
no more entry, resulting in a negative profits to the deviating entrant. Hence the proposed
equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium.
In equilibrium, certifiers diﬀerentiate their tests by choosing diﬀerent cutoﬀs, and
each certifier captures the sellers between his own cutoﬀ and the cutoﬀ of the certifier
of immediate higher rank. Since the test is deterministic, no sellers fail their chosen
certification test, and it follows that sellers tested by a higher-ranked certifier will enjoy
a higher increase in market value through certification than sellers attending a lower
certifier. Prices increase in certifier rank because sellers with a high object quality have a
higher willingness to pay for being tested than sellers with a low product quality. Hence
the higher increase in market value from being certified by a higher-ranked certifier is oﬀset
by a higher price paid for certification, a point we elaborate on in the welfare section.
Certifiers distribute themselves with increasing proximity as we move up along the
unit line, because for a given interval length, it is more lucrative to certify a group of
sellers at the top of the unit line than at the bottom. Hence, there must be more certifiers
at the top than at the bottom of the interval, relative to the underlying distribution of
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projects.4
It is plausible that the fixed costs associated with rigging a test is an increasing function
of the location of the cutoﬀ. Such an increasing function could reflect that separating high-
quality products requires a more complex test technology than separating low-quality
products.5 We should therefore notice, therefore that while the first and the fourth part
of Proposition 1 rest on the particular shape of F (.), the more important second and
third part of Proposition 1 do not rely on this assumption. In particular, we do not rely
on this assumption for obtaining price monotonicity, the result we later will attempt to
test with data from the MBA market. Likewise, the results that will be tested are robust
to the introduction of positive marginal costs of certification, since in the constructed
equilibrium such marginal costs will only aﬀect the size of the interval certified necessary
to make zero profit, not price monotonicity.6
The role of the prices being fixed at stage 1 is to ensure the existence of equilibria, for
the following reason. In equilibrium, some sellers must be indiﬀerent as to which certifier
to attend to. If prices are fully flexible this condition cannot hold, since the bottom
certifier (think of two neighboring certifiers) can get a discontinuous jump in customer
base by lowering the price for certification by a small amount.7 Since it is not obvious
which mechanisms prohibit certifiers to adjust their prices relatively rapidly (one could be
reputation eﬀects), we remark that the equilibrium obtained in Proposition 1 can also be
derived in a repeated version of the game, where n and {Ik} is determined first, and then
a collusive agreement is (implicitly or explicitly) formed between the n entering certifiers
4The market for auditors seems at odds with the first and the fourth part of Proposition 1, since all
the Big 5 specialize in the upper end of the market. This phenomenon can be made consistent with
Proposition 1 by assuming that the distribution of projects is skewed to the right, rather than being
uniform (or, less likely, F is lower for a higher cutoﬀ). Or it could be that the Big 5 avoid competition
by specializing in diﬀerent geographical regions (see Dunne et al., 2000, for such evidence).
5Or it could reflect that the cost of establishing a reputation of truth-telling is higher for a higher
cutoﬀ.
6Notice that as long as tests are of the suggested cutoﬀ structure, we can construct exactly the same
equilibrium as in Proposition 1, but where each certifier sets an arbitrary number of cutoﬀs, when the
fixed cost F is incurred for each cutoﬀ.
7With noise, we conjecture that there exists an equilibrium with flexible prices where the second, third
and fourth property of Proposition 1 hold. Hence the predictions that we later test for the MBA market
should also hold under flexible prices.
Notice also that if the entering certifiers choose the same cutoﬀ, flexible prices will mean Bertrand
competition and negative profits. Hence there cannot exist such a symmetric equilibrium.
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on pricing behavior. The pricing behavior of Proposition 1 could in a repeated setting
be sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium (for a suﬃciently high discount factor) by
other certifiers punishing a deviating certifier by dumping the price of certification.8
While the constructed equilibrium is not unique, in Appendix B we show that it
survives a natural refinement, which eliminates many other equilibria. The refinement is
constructed by perturbing the game slightly, by including a small positive probability of
potential entrants not using their entry possibility even when the existing certifiers make
a positive profit.9 In Section 3.3, we consider the case when the certification tests are
noisy. We show that the constructed equilibrium is robust to the introduction of noise,
and moreover that noise ensures that all sellers strictly prefers to attend the certifier
suggested by Proposition 1.
3.2 Related results
Lizzeri (1999) considers a setting with a monopoly certifier with access to a perfect and
zero cost test technology. The main result is that such a certifier will reveal as little
information as possible about the sellers that are certified, and subtract all the surplus
from the market (this is equivalent to setting a cutoﬀ equal to zero and a price equal to 1
2
).
We get the same result for F = 1
2
, where Proposition 1 implies that one certifier enters,
sets cutoﬀ equal to 0, and a price equal to 1
2
. For F ∈ (1
4
, 1
2
), there would also be only
one certifier entering, but (conditional on this certifier setting the cutoﬀ at zero, which
can be sustained as an equilibrium) the price of certification would have to be lower than
the monopoly price, to avoid entry. For F < 1
4
, Proposition 1 implies that there will be
two or more certifiers entering the market, setting diﬀerent cutoﬀs and charging diﬀerent
prices, and the equilibrium will be of a diﬀerent type than that studied by Lizzeri (1999).
8For a recent paper on price collusion in dynamic settings, see Athey et al. (2000). We can notice
that the price-setting mechanism in the model is similar to that in the theory of contestable markets
of Baumol et al. (1982), since existing certifiers cannot adjust prices in response to entry. However, in
contrast to the present theory, the theory of contestable markets lacks a plausible interpretation in terms
of dynamic collusion since the contestable market outcome (monopolist pricing equals average cost) does
not maximize the joint profits of the incumbent and the (potential) entrant.
9This may be due to e.g., government regulation banning the entry of additional certifiers.
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Hence we get the same result as Lizzeri (1999), but only in the special case F = 1
4
.10
In the product diﬀerentiation model of Salop (1979), producers compete for customers
on a unit circle. Customers demand one unit inelastically, and trade oﬀ transportation
costs with price when deciding which producer to attend to. Producers incur a fixed cost
each when entering, and in equilibrium all producers make zero profits.
Both the Salop (1979) model and the present model have the property that the free
entry condition drives profits to zero, and that the number of active firms is determined
by the size of the fixed cost. When the fixed costs go to zero in the Salop model, the
market converges to a competitive market (prices equal marginal cost, which we can think
of as zero). It is interesting to notice that pricing in the limit case is very diﬀerent in our
setting.
Remark 1 As F tends to zero,
• The price charged for certifying a product with quality x, equals x, i.e., perfect price
discrimination.
Furthermore,
• Certifiers become distributed according to the frequency function 2x.
• There is full revelation of private information.
Proof. We first prove the first and the third part of the result, and then the second
part. In the equilibrium outlined in Proposition 1, certifier k attracts all sellers on the
interval [Ik, Ik+1), and charges the price Pk =
(Ik + Ik+1)
2
, where k = 1, ..., n. Ik, Ik+1
and n are determined such that all certifiers make zero profits, and in particular certifier
k makes zero profits. By making F small, zero profits of certifier k implies that |Ik+1− Ik|
can be made arbitrarily small, and hence that Pk tends to Ik when F tends to zero. It also
follows that as F tends to zero, the number of certifiers grow (and choose diﬀerent cutoﬀs)
10The second main result of Lizzeri, Theorem 6, says that if there are two or more certifiers in the mar-
ket, who both have access to a perfect test technology, there will be full revelation of private information,
by a Bertrand competition type of argument. In contrast, full revelation will only be an equilibrium in
our model when the fixed cost of testing approaches zero (see Remark 1).
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and we can get arbitrarily close to the case where all private information is revealed. Now
the second part. Let H(x;F ) be the fraction of certifiers that set a cutoﬀ below x in
equilibrium. We derive this function and show that it equals x2 when F tends to zero.
From Proposition 1, it will be the k-th certifier from above that will have cutoﬀ equal to
x, where k is given by the solution to,
√
1− 2kF = x.(4)
Using this expression givesH(x) = x2 and h(x) = 2x, where h(.) is the frequency function.
3.3 Noisy tests
In this section we add noise to the basic model. The purpose of the section is twofold.
First, we show that the equilibrium derived in the previous section is robust to the in-
troduction of noise, and that noise ensures that all sellers strictly prefers to attend the
certifier it attends according to Proposition 1, given the behavior of certifiers. Second,
we show that with noise, the net gain from being certified must be increasing in x in
equilibrium, an implication we later on will attempt to test.
Assume now that the certification technology is not flawless, so that certifier k observes
the quality of a seller with a normally distributed noise εσk , with mean zero and standard
deviation σk. As before, we will be looking for an equilibrium with cutoﬀs 0 < I1 < · · · <
In < 1, where the sellers on [Ik, Ik+1) attend to certifier k, and the sellers in [0, I1] are
not certified. We will now have another host of free parameters Πk — the probability with
which type Ik fails the test of certifier k.
Ik and Πk determine the quality type tk that passes the test of certifier k with prob-
ability half. This type tk is the ’announced’ cutoﬀ of certifier k, and it can be found by
using the inverse of the cumulative normal distribution with variance σ2k. However, tk will
play no explicit role in the analysis.11
Let Ek(σk, Ik,Πk, Ik+1) be the expected payoﬀ of type Ik when she goes to certifier k.
11A seller passes (fails) the test of certifier k if x˜ > tk (x˜ < tk), where x˜ = x+ εσk . Notice that Ik = tk
in the deterministic version of the model, but that will no longer be true with noise.
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If Sk(σk, Ik,Πk, Ik+1) is the average successful type in the interval of types [Ik, Ik+1) that
take test k, and Fk(σk, Ik, πk, Ik+1) is the average failing type in [Ik, Ik+1), then
Ek = (1− Πk)Sk +ΠkFk.(5)
When σk and πk are very small, then Sk is close to 12 (Ik + Ik+1), because the ratio of
success probabilities (densities, to be precise) of types in diﬀerent parts of [Ik, Ik+1) is
almost 1:1. Therefore, Ek tends to 12 (Ik + Ik+1) when σk and Πk tend to zero.
Denote by πk(σk−1, Ik−1, πk−1, Ik) the probability that Ik would fail the test of certifier
k − 1. Clearly, πk < Πk. Thus
Hk(σk−1, Ik−1, πk−1, Ik) = (1− πk)Sk−1 + πkFk−1(6)
would be the expected remuneration of type Ik had she gone to certifier k − 1. By the
same argument as before, Hk tends to 12 (Ik−1 + Ik) when σk−1 and πk−1 tend to zero.
There are two sets of equilibrium conditions. Condition (ik) expresses the indiﬀerence
of type Ik between taking the test of certifier k or certifier k − 1:
Ek(σk, Ik, πk, Ik+1)− Pk = Hk(σk−1, Ik−1, πk−1, Ik)− Pk−1(ik)
Condition (pk) expresses the zero profit of certifier k:
Pk(Ik+1 − Ik) = F(pk)
Now, when Πk and σk are zero (so that εσk is the unit mass at zero), then Ek =
1
2
(Ik + Ik+1) and Hk = 12 (Ik−1 + Ik), and the system becomes
1
2
(Ik + Ik+1)− Pk = 1
2
(Ik−1 + Ik)− Pk−1(i0k)
Pk(Ik+1 − Ik) = F(p0k)
The equilibrium Ik, Pk from the previous section is clearly a solution to this system of
equations. The question is, therefore, whether for small enough Π0k and σ
0
k we can find
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close-by solutions I 0k, P
0
k that solve the perturbed system ik, pk.
The answer to this question is positive, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium of Proposition 1 is robust to the introduction of a small
degree of noise. Moreover, for any degree of noise, there exists an equilibrium with the
same structure as in Proposition 1, except for the behavior of the bottom certifier.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The equilibrium with noise is the same as the equilibrium without noise with respect
to the distribution of cutoﬀs and prices, except for the behavior of the bottom certifier.
In the noisy equilibrium some sellers fail the test (which can be interpreted as not being
certified). As can easily be shown, the market value of those objects passing the test of
certifier k must be higher than those objects failing to pass the test of certifier k + 1.
On the net gains from certification, the deterministic model tells us that the returns
are constant in x. As an instant corollary of the Proposition 2, we get the following result
on the distribution of net surplus under noise.
Corollary 1 With noise, the (expected) net surplus from certification is strictly increasing
in x.
The intuition for the result is that with noise, a seller with a higher x has a higher prob-
ability of passing a given test, and hence must obtain a higher net surplus in equilibrium
than a seller with a lower x.
Notice that this type of result would follow in any model of certification (with noise)
where a high type can imitate the behavior of a low type and get at least as high payoﬀ,
which seems almost a defining feature of certification (for example, we can think of much
more general test structures, accommodating richer estimates of the object’s value, and
a more general cost function underlying the certification process).
This type of monotonicity result is standard in signaling models, where a higher type
can imitate the behavior of a lower type and obtain at least the same payoﬀ (see e.g.,
Fudenberg & Tirole, 1992). The main diﬀerence between the present model of certifica-
tion and models of signaling, as in Spence (1973), is that while signaling models treat the
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institution that directly or indirectly transmits information to the market as passive enti-
ties, we treat them as active, strategic, players.12 Hence we can view the present model of
certification as a step towards providing a microfoundation for signaling models, since we
get a similar type of equilibrium, but resting on more primitive assumptions about mar-
ket structure. In particular, in our setting prices (tuition fees) and signal informativeness
depend on the structure of equilibrium rather than being assumption-based.13
4 Empirics
We have constructed a model of certification with multiple certifiers, where diﬀerent
certifiers attract diﬀerent segments of the market and charge diﬀerent prices. In this
section, we wish to confront the theory with data.
Suppose that we rank certifiers according to how much they (on average) add to the
market value of the objects that are certified. Then the two main empirical implications of
the model are that: (1) Certifiers with higher rank charge higher prices for certification,
and that (2) Net surplus of a seller is increasing in the rank of the certifier the seller
attends to, holding pre-certification market information about its value constant.
We choose the market for MBA education as a testbed for the theory for two reasons.
The first is that certification presumably plays an important role in this market, and the
second reason is that relevant data, e.g., on pre-MBA and post-MBA wages, and the costs
of tuition, is relatively easily accessible.
Before we proceed with the analysis, we can notice that within finance, there is a
large empirical literature on the certifying role of various financial institutions, starting
with the proposal of the ’Certification Hypothesis’ by Booth & Smith (1986). For exam-
ple, Megginson & Weiss (1991) tests whether venture capitalists fill a certifier role when
backing IPOs, and Puri (1996) investigates the certifying role of investment banks and
12For example, Weiss (1983) considers a setting where employers oﬀer contracts that condition payment
on a final test. In the final test of Weiss (1983), there are two grade levels, ’fail’ and ’pass’, as in our
setting. However, in contrast with our setting, the test is the same for everyone, and neither the test
standard nor the tuition fees are subject to choice by the education institution.
13The usual interpretation of costs in the Spence model is that of cost of eﬀort, but clearly cost of
tuition must enter the picture too.
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commercial banks (before the Glass-Steagall Act). The present paper is to our knowledge
the first paper to include an empirical analysis of certification that i) is based on an equi-
librium model, and ii) takes into account both the market value increase and the cost of
being certified (the papers cited above consider only the market value increase). Let us
now describe the data, discuss our test strategy, and then describe the empirical results.
4.1 Data
Our primary source of data is the Financial Times 2001 ranking of MBA programs world-
wide based on the 1998 class (FT 2001). FT 2001 includes information on (average)
student characteristics at each program, such as salaries before and 3 years after the
MBA, percentage of international students, alumni networks, etc. FT 2001 also includes
data on program characteristics such as faculty research output, and faculty Ph.D. ratio,
sex ratio, etc. In addition to the FT ranking we use the Oﬃcial MBA Guide for informa-
tion on GMAT scores and costs of tuition for the programs. We confine the analysis to
the two-year US programs in the FT 2001 that provides tuition fees and (average) GMAT
scores in the Oﬃcial MBA guide, which gives a sample size of 48 programs.14
4.2 Test strategy
If MBA students were observationally equivalent in the market ex-ante, their wages would
be the same before the MBA, and we could rank programs according to the post-MBA
wages they generate. In that case, we could test hypothesis (1) simply by evaluating
the correlation between post-MBA wages and the costs of tuition. However, diﬀerent
programs attract students with diﬀerent observable characteristics (in contrast to in the
model), and therefore post-MBA wages is not a proper measure of program rank. To
control for student heterogeneity when testing hypothesis (1), we therefore regress post-
MBA wage on the cost of tuition, controlling for pre-MBA wage and GMAT diﬀerences,
and interpret the resulting coeﬃcient as the relation between program rank and cost of
14100 programs are ranked in FT 2001. All wage figures are indexed to the 2000 level. Since the cost
of tuition is relatively stable over time, we have used the easily available cost of tuition for year 2000
figures, rather than indexing the 1995 figures.
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tuition.15 A positive and significant coeﬃcient would then indicate that a higher post-
MBA value is associated with a higher cost of tuition, and would confirm (1).
To test hypothesis (2), we need to take into account that an MBA degree is an in-
vestment it can take several years to justify. We therefore construct a measure of net
value added (NVA) that takes into account both the stream of income generated from an
MBA degree, the stream of foregone income, and tuition costs. We then regress NVA on
a measure of the rank of a program, controlling for diﬀerences in student quality that are
observable in the market ex-ante. If the coeﬃcient on the rank of program is positive,
we take this as evidence in favor of hypothesis (2). Since pre-MBA wage is included in
our measure of NVA (to evaluate opportunity costs), we can only control for (observable)
ability characteristics with the GMAT variable. Also, since it is problematic to construct
a rank of a program that is not based on variables that are already included in NVA, we
use the research rating index provided by Financial Times as a proxy for rank.16
Before describing the tests in more detail, let us oﬀer two comments. First, strictly
speaking we should decompose the eﬀect of attending an MBA program into two parts, the
value added stemming from increases in human capital, and the value added that stems
from certification, i.e., the identification of student qualities that are not observable in the
market ex-ante. Given the data limitations, we cannot perform such a decomposition, and
we will for now simply assume that the increases in value due to human capital acquisition
is roughly constant across programs, in which case human capital acquisition will only
turn up in the regression intercepts.17
Second, while there are no entry rejections in the model (and sellers ’apply’ to one
certifier only), entry rejections clearly take place in the real MBA market, reflecting noise
15Although GMAT scores are probably less observable than wages in the market ex-ante, including this
variable is a simple way of correcting bias due to omitted observable variables such as occupational level
(aﬀecting e.g., expected career path) and geographical variations in employment (aﬀecting take home
value of salary).
16The research rating of a program is a number on a scale from 0 to 100 based on publication in
scientific journals of the faculty of that business school. For example, Harvard gets 100, Wharton 91,
Stanford 85, MIT 70, Northwestern 53, Yale 40, Wisconsin 28, and Thunderbird 17.
17A third possible gain from undertaking an MBA degree is that of establishing contacts in the business
world, that can turn important later in the career. Such networking is a good example of the certification
that goes in within programs (and can be reflected in the costs of tuition): the signal received after
certification (in the noisy version of the model) can be interpreted as being accepted into an important
student group or not, rather than as grades.
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in the admittance process. Although entry decisions are noisy (at least from the student’s
standpoint), it is probably true that entry decisions are rather deterministic within a class
of programs. For example, a good student applies for all programs between rank 5 and 10,
and is admitted to at least one of them with a high probability. As long as the strength
of the certification is not significantly diﬀerent between the program ranked 5 and the
program ranked 10, this diﬀerence between the model and reality is not essential.
4.3 Results
We first evaluate hypothesis (1), by regressing post-MBA wage on the cost of tuition, pre-
MBA wage and GMAT scores. We obtained the following results (standard deviations in
parentheses).18
Table 1 Relation between post-MBA wage and tuition cost
MBA 2001 MBA 2000
Variable (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Intercept 1079581 48964 -76227 55284
(1235704) (12659) (1354858) (14036)
Salary before 0,593 ... 0,489 ...
(0,388) (0,361)
GMAT -3623 ... -115 ...
(3762) (4116)
GMAT^2 310 ... 0,47 ...
(287) (3,137)
Tuition cost 0,809 1,44 0,667 1,29
(0,273) (0,303) (0,278) (0,329)
n 48 48 41 41
R2 64% 33% 62% 28%
Considering first (II), we find a strong positive raw correlation between post-MBA
wage and tuition cost (TC). Since a higher cost of tuition may reflect both improved
18The regressions were performed in MINITAB. The regression procedures are obtainable from the
authors.
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unobservable and observable student characteristics ex-ante, in column (I) we control for
observable diﬀerences in student quality by including pre-MBA wage and GMAT scores in
the regression. The relation between post-MBA wage and TC is now weaker, as expected,
but it is still positive and highly significant.19 To check the robustness of this finding, we
performed the same regressions on the FT 2000 data and obtained very similar results,
see (III) and (IV).20 Hence the support of (1) seems fairly strong in the data.21
We now evaluate hypothesis (2). We confine the analysis to constructing a measure
of NVA from the start of a program to four years after graduation, expecting the returns
in this 6-year window to be highly correlated with the total returns. Undertaking an
MBA degree has three eﬀects on the stream of income during the 6-year interval. The
negative eﬀects are the payment of tuition fees and two years of foregone income, and
the positive eﬀect is the salary jump resulting from a degree. We assume that the rate of
salary growth, x, is the same with and without a degree.22 Denote the pre-MBA wage by
wt−2 and the wage three years after graduation as wt+3 and define NVA as,
NVA := a(x)wt+3 − b(x)wt−2 − TC(Net value added)
The first term on the right side reflects the stream of income after an MBA is undertaken.
The second term reflects the opportunity cost of undertaking an MBA, and the third term
is the cost of tuition. Setting x to 0% gives a = 4 and b = 6, while setting x to e.g., .5%
gives a = 3, 91 and b = 6, 80.23
19For FT 2001, the t-value for the coeﬃcient on tuition cost is 2,97, and the corresponding p-value
equals 0,005.
20However, the similar findings can partly be explained by the same cost and GMAT data being used
for the two years, and we therefore performed an alternative test of (1). In this alternative test, we first
generated a rank of schools, according to the procedure of Tracy & Waldfogel (1997). This procedure
regresses post-MBA wage on student characteristics, and ranks schools according to the magnitude of
the residuals from this regression. To test (1), we then regressed the residuals on TC, and obtained the
same type of results here as those expressed in Table 1.
As a curiosity, the induced ranking for the FT 2001 became: 1. Columbia, 2. Wharton, 3. Chicago, 4.
Harvard, 5. Cornell, 6. Emory, 7. Georgetown, 8. Duke, 9. Vanderbilt, and 10. Southern Methodist.
21We can notice that the result is also consistent with a full-information human capital explanation,
where a higher increase in human capital implies a higher cost of tuition. The data limitations prohibit
us from exploring the relative merit of the certification explanation and the human capital explanation.
22With data only on wages at two diﬀerent points in time, it is not possible to identify both growth
rates and the wage jump resulting from an MBA degree.
23For a given x, the coeﬃcients a and b are determined as, a(x) =
P2
j=0
1
(1+x)j + (1 + x), and b(x) =
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We wish to test whether NVA is positively correlated with rank, holding student
characteristics constant. Again, because of the identification problems associated with
using post-MBA wage as a measure of rank and wt−2 as a measure of the (observable)
individual eﬀect, we use the research rating index provided by the Financial Times as
a proxy for the certification eﬀect, and GMAT scores to control for observable student
characteristics.24 For regressions (V) and (VI), we use x = 8%, which gives a = 3, 86 and
b = 7, 33.
Table 2 Determinants of NVA
MBA 2001 MBA 2000
Variable (V) (VI)
Intercept 2767032 -4296144
(5088130) (5698778)
Research rating 952 875
(578) (533)
GMAT -9742 11447
(15509) (17353)
GMAT^2 8,1 -7,8
(11,81) (13,19)
R2 27% 35%
The interpretation of the coeﬃcient on the research rating variable is the eﬀect on
net value of being admitted to a higher program, holding (observable) student quality
constant. The estimated increase in NVA from being admitted to a program with one
point better research rating is approximately $900 in both samples.25 This result is robust
to the specification of the growth rate. For x = 5%, the coeﬃcient on research rating
is 1108 (566), and for x = 10%, the coeﬃcient is 847 (588). We also got similar results
P5
j=0(1 + x)
j .
24In the 2001 sample, the correlation coeﬃcient between research rating and the ranking obtained by
using the Tracy-Waldfogel procedure equals 0.4, and the correlation between GMAT and wt−2 equals
to 0.49. Data limitations prohibit us from using instruments that are more highly correlated with the
independent variables.
25The p-values are approximately .10 for both samples. However, since GMAT scores do not capture
all observable individual characteristics, we expect the $900 estimate to be biased somewhat upwards,
since increased research rating also will reflect observable diﬀerences in increased student quality.
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from letting the growth rate with an MBA be higher than the growth rate without an
MBA. Extending the window to four years after graduation gives a higher estimated
coeﬃcient on research rating (1417), and a lower p-value (0,059). In sum, these findings
give support to (2); that NVA is positively correlated with being admitted to a program
of higher rank.26
5 Welfare and Public Policy
In this section we make some remarks on the eﬀect of intermediaries on welfare. Let us
define social surplus as total seller surplus + total profits for certifiers, and for simplicity
consider an environment where projects are distributed uniformly on [a, b], where a < b
and b > 0. Notice that trade eﬃciency implies that only the objects on [0,b] are traded.
For simplicity, we consider the deterministic version of the model, with 1
2F
∈ {1, 2, 3, ...}.
Remark 2 In the equilibrium constructed in Proposition 1, the social surplus generated
is 0, and hence the existence of certifiers does not increase social surplus.
Proof. First consider the case when a ≥ 0. In that case, we can without loss of
generality normalize, and set a = 0 and b = 1. Notice that with no intermediary in the
market, the social surplus generated is equal to
R 1
0
dx = 1
2
. With certifiers, we need to
subtract the cost of testing. Recall that the number of active certifiers equals
1
2F
, the
cost per certifier equals F , and hence there is full dissipation of rents for any F > 0, since
F
2F
=
1
2
. Now consider the case a < 0. There are then two cases, E(x) < 0 and E(x) > 0.
In the first case, there will be no trade without certifiers, and social surplus equals zero, as
is the case with entry of certifiers. In the latter case, there will be positive social surplus
26Two remarks. First, we noticed in the theoretical part that (2) would follow from any model of
certification where a high type can imitate the behavior of a low type and get at least as high payoﬀ,
which seems to be almost a defining feature of certification. Hence the test of (2) can perhaps primarily
be viewed as a test of whether a broad class of certification models make sense for the MBA market,
rather than only the particular model constructed.
Second, under the competing human capital acquisition interpretation of MBA education, (2) is not
obviously true because which school fits best to a student can be a matching question. For example,
a mediocre student might not be ’up to it’ at e.g., Harvard. The confirmation of (2), and also the
larger rejection rates at higher ranked places, indicate that either matching is not important (contrary
to standard MBA wisdom) or that certification is important.
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without certifiers and zero social surplus with certifiers. Hence, the existence of certifiers
cannot enhance welfare.
Hence, a market with free entry of certifiers is characterized by low welfare, due to
the cost of testing oﬀsetting the potentially improved gains from trade.27 The intuition
is that in the equilibrium constructed in Proposition 1, certifiers make zero profits, and
moreover each certifier exercises monopoly power over its segment of the market, so that
seller surplus is also low.
Notice that with noise and with 1
2F
/∈ {1, 2, 3, ...}, the negative result will modified,
since there will be some social surplus, but not by much.28 We can also notice that there
is nothing tautological in free entry and fixed costs implying a low welfare level, as can be
seen from the Salop (1979) model, where competition can drive prices down to marginal
costs, for suﬃciently low fixed costs.29
In the extension of this negative result, it is natural to discuss the role of public
policy. Leland (1977) argued that minimum quality standards can enhance trade surplus,
by shutting oﬀ the lemons from the market. While the minimum quality standards in
Leland (1977) are enforced directly by the regulators, in our setting it is natural to think
of minimum quality standards as being enforced by certifiers, and the policy makers
regulating trade through regulating the certifiers.
Assuming that F is suﬃciently low, trade eﬃciency implies that only objects with value
above 0 are certified. The following remark shows that trade eﬃciency can be obtained
by simply allowing only one certifier (perhaps a governmental agency, as is common for
e.g., driving licenses).
27The analysis of the MBA market gives some empirical support to this result, in that the mean net
value added four years after graduation lies between -50.000$ and -100.000$ (depending on discounting
factor).
28This follows from the fact that with 12F /∈ {1, 2, ...}, the sum of seller surplus must equal the mass
below the first certifier, which will be small for F small, see Appendix A. Of course, we can construct
examples where 12F /∈ {1, 2, ...} and E(x) < 0, where the existence of certifiers enhances welfare. But
comparing it to the magnitude of welfare loss in the cases whereE(x) > 0, the basic message of Proposition
2 is valid.
We can also notice that in a (non-collusive) equilibrium with price competition, the negative result will
also be modified, since certifiers lower prices from the monopoly level to attract sellers, as in the Salop
(1979) model of product diﬀerentiation.
29Since consumers demand one unit inelastically in the Salop model, consumer surplus would be infinite
for any finite price. To make a proper analysis of welfare, we would thus strictly speaking need to adjust
the Salop model by assuming a finite reservation price.
22
Remark 3 Allowing only one certifier ensures trade eﬃciency, but this monopolist takes
all surplus in the market.
Proof. As can easily be shown, there exists an equilibrium where the monopolist
certifier sets the cutoﬀ at zero and a price such that all the seller surplus is extracted. By
setting the cutoﬀ diﬀerent from zero, the trade surplus will be less, and the profit must
in that case also be less.
With this solution, all surplus in the market is accrued by the certifier. Notice that
the same type of results exists when tests are noisy. The key to understanding this
result is that the certifier can set I very low (or very high), to mimic the solution of the
deterministic case.
It may be tempting to obtain a less skewed distribution of surplus in the market by
regulating the price set by the certifier. However, such a policy is implemented at a cost,
as the following result points out.
Remark 4 Under price regulation, too many objects will be certified and traded.
Proof. For a given price set by the policy makers, PG < 1
2
, the monopolist sets I
as low as possible, subject to the constraint that the sellers prefer being certified to not
being certified. Assuming that not being certified has value zero (which will be confirmed
in equilibrium), we must have that,
PG ≤ (1 + I)/2, or equivalently,(7)
I ≥ 2PG − 1(8)
Since the monopolist maximizes profits, this inequality must be binding, and hence I =
2PG − 1. It follows that if PG < 1
2
, then I < 0, and too many objects are traded.
While the distributional problem outlined in Remark 3 can be alleviated by proper
profit taxes (rather than through price regulation), a perhaps more serious problem of the
monopoly solution is that, since sellers make a low surplus, there are be low incentives
for investments in quality upfront. To admit only one certifier in the market can hence
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induce a more eﬃcient level of trade, but a low level of investments.30
The optimal regulation given concerns about both trade eﬃciency and investment
levels is a challenging question, one reason being that one needs to specify both the
instruments and the information available to the policy makers. We leave this question
for future study, but remark that in the case where the policy makers can aﬀect only I, it
may be optimal to set I in a manner that conflicts with trade eﬃciency, because a high
I may ensure a high level of investments, but may also shut oﬀ from the market objects
that should have been traded.31
6 Conclusion
We have constructed a model of certification with fixed costs and free entry, where each
certifier diﬀerentiates its certification test according to which segment of the market it
targets. The model accommodates several stylized facts from certifying markets such as
there being several active certifiers, where diﬀerent certifiers capture diﬀerent segments
of the market, and where the increase in market value from being certified is highly
dependent on which certifier issued the certificate.
From the model, we derived the testable implications that the price for being certified
should increase in the rank of a certifier, and that the net surplus of sellers should increase
in their object’s true value. We investigated the validity of these two predictions in the
market for MBA education and received empirical support for both.
We also used the model to consider questions of regulation and minimum quality
standards, when the regulators cannot observe quality directly, and showed that allowing
only one certifier into the market can ensure trade eﬃciency, but that incentives for
investments can be low under such a policy.
One extension of the present work would be to apply the model to other settings than
30In the same type of settting as Lizzeri (1999), Albano & Lizzeri (2001) considers the incentives for a
monopolist certifier to reveal information about the projects being certified, when the monopolist takes
into account that no revelation (as in Remark 2) gives no incentives to invest in quality.
31A related issue is whether the policy makers would want to allow the monopolist to certify several
standards, or by allowing more than one certifier to enter, in order to increase the incentives for making
investments in quality.
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the MBA market. For example, it would be interesting see whether the predictions of the
model finds support in the market for investment bank certification of IPOs, or in the
venture capital market. Another extension would be to discuss policy questions in more
detail, taking into account informational and institutional restrictions of real markets.
7 Appendix A: Proofs
In this appendix we first show that there exists an equilibrium ’close’ to the equilibrium
proposed in Proposition 1 when 1
2F
/∈ {1, 2, ...}, and then prove Proposition 2.
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We look for an equilibrium with cutoﬀs 0 < I1 < · · · < In < 1, where all sellers are
indiﬀerent between being certified and not being certified, and where their remuneration
will be s = I1
2
.
The individuals in [In, 1] will therefore be willing to pay at most
Pn =
In + 1
2
− s.(A1)
The zero-profit condition for certifier n is hence
F = Pn(1− In) =
µ
In + 1
2
− s
¶
(1− In).(A2)
The quadratic equation for In is thus
(In)
2 − 2sIn − (1− 2s) + 2F = 0(A3)
with the relevant root
In = s+
√
s2 + 1− 2s− 2F .(A4)
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We therefore have
Pn =
In + 1
2
− s =
√
s2 + 1− 2s− 2F + 1− s
2
(A5)
Similarly, the individuals in [In−1, In] will be willing to pay at most
Pn−1 =
In−1 + In
2
− s,(A6)
and the zero-profit condition for certifier n− 1 is
F = Pn−1(In − In−1) =
µ
In−1 + In
2
− s
¶
(1− In).(A7)
The quadratic equation for In−1 is thus
0 = (In−1)
2 − 2sIn−1 − In(In − 2s) + 2F = (A8)
(In−1)
2 − 2sIn−1 − (1− 2s− 2F ) + 2F
with the relevant root
In−1 = s+
√
s2 + 1− 2s− 4F .(A9)
We thus have
Pn−1 =
In−1 + In
2
− s =
√
s2 + 1− 2s− 4F +√s2 + 1− 2s− 2F
2
(A10)
Inductively, when we finally get to I1 we get the solution
2s = I1 = s+
√
s2 + 1− 2s− 2nF .(A11)
Hence
s =
1− 2nF
2
(A12)
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so the maximal n for which there is a solution is
n =
¹
1
2F
º
,(A13)
and
I1 = 1− 2nF .(A14)
We can now substitute s in all the above equations, and express the Ik − s and Pk − s as
a function of F and n (the expressions are not illuminating, though).
Taking the largest possible n for a given F , one can see that the smaller F is, the
smaller is also the diﬀerence between n =
¥
1
2F
¦
and 1
2F
, and therefore the smaller is also
s =
1−2b 12F cF
2
. Hence, although there will be a surplus for the worker when 1
2F
/∈ {1, 2, ...},
the surplus will be small when F is small.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
There exists such a perturbed solution where I 01 is smaller than I1 but arbitrarily close
to it, while I 0k = Ik for k = 2, . . . , n (and therefore, by condition (pk), P
0
k = Pk for
k = 2, . . . , n). To see this, suppose that I 01 = I1 − ε, for an arbitrarily small but positive
ε. Then in comparison with the benchmark equilibrium, the payoﬀ from not getting
certified decreases by ε
2
. If certification were faultproof, the gross payoﬀ from going to the
first certifier (net of the certification cost) would also decrease by ε
2
. However since now
I 02 − I 01 = I2 − I 01 > I2 − I1, by condition (p1) we have that P 01 < P1. Thus, to make the
type I 01 just indiﬀerent between going to the first certifier and not getting certified at all,
all that is needed is to design Π01 (the probability that type I1 passes the first certifier)
so that the decrease in its price is compensated by the further decrease in the expected
payoﬀ:
P1 − P 01 =
I 01 + I
0
2
2
−E 01(A15)
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OnceΠ01 is determined, so is π
0
2 — the probability of the type I
0
2(= I2) to pass certifier 1, and
therefore also H 02. Inductively, suppose H
0
k has been determined. One has now to choose
Π0k (which, given I
0
k = Ik and I
0
k+1 = Ik+1, determines also Ek) so that condition (ik)
holds. Repeating this procedure consecutively for k = 2, . . . , n establishes the perturbed
equilibrium.
That all sellers strictly prefer to attend to the certifier suggested (except those with
x = Ik, who are indiﬀerent between attending certifier k and certifier k − 1) follows from
the following argument. If type Ik went to certifier k− 1, it would be further to the right
from the mean tk−1 than the extent it would be to the right of the mean tk when it goes to
certifier k. Now notice that the cumulative probability function flattens towards the far
right (this is a general property of distributions with a finite mean and infinite support -
not just a property of the normal distribution.) So type x > Ik has only a slightly bigger
probability than Ik to pass the test of certifier k − 1, and a relatively bigger advantage
over Ik in the chances to pass certifier k. So if Ik is indiﬀerent between certifiers k and
k − 1, any type x > Ik strictly prefers certifier k over certifier k − 1. This argument
establishes that any x ∈ (Ik, Ik+1) prefers to attend certifier k to attend certifier k − 1.
The same type of argument can be used to prove that type x ∈ (Ik, Ik+1) prefers certifier
k to certifier k+1, and by induction that type x ∈ (Ik, Ik+1) prefers certifier k to all other
certifiers.
8 Appendix B: Uniqueness
The equilibrium constructed in Proposition 1 rests on two sets of oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path
beliefs. First, sellers believe that if they are not certified, buyers take this as an indication
of their object being the worst possible quality. Since all sellers are certified in equilibrium,
these beliefs are not contradicted in equilibrium. Second, a certifier believes that if he has
positive profits if there would be no more entry, then there will be other certifiers entering
and ruining his profits. Since certifiers make zero profits in equilibrium, neither of these
beliefs are contradicted in equilibrium. These oﬀ-equilibrium-path beliefs are consistent
with many other equilibria too, since essentially all that is required from equilibrium is
that all active certifiers make zero profits. The purpose of the following discussion is to
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show that given the out-of-equilibrium-path beliefs, the constructed equilibrium survives a
natural refinement, which eliminates many other equilibria. The idea of the refinement is
that if there is a positive probability of potential entrants not using their entry possibility,
even when the existing certifiers make a positive profit, the first certifier entering at stage
1 will have incentive to enter at the bottom of the interval (I1), to ensure positive profits
in the case where other certifiers are shut oﬀ from the market. By the same argument,
the next certifier will have incentive to enter not too far from the first certifier (I2), and
so forth, until an equilibrium similar to the one proposed will be played (with probability
(1-ε)n). Here, we confine ourselves to showing how the argument works for F = 1
4
.
For F = 1
4
, the proposed equilibrium has two active certifiers, with cutoﬀs and prices
equal to I1 = 0, P1 = .35, and I2 = .71, P2 = .85. Suppose now that with some exogenous
probability ε, where ε is small, the market will be closed for entry after the first certifier
has entered and set (I, P ). We now consider four diﬀerent strategies (I, P ) for the first
certifier entering. i) to play (I1, P1) as above, ii) to play (I2, P2), iii) to play (I , P ), where
I 6= I1, such that Π = 0, and iv) to play (I , P ), where I 6= I1,I2 such that Π > 0. Π refers
to the profit of the first certifier, without entry of any other certifiers.
Now consider the payoﬀ from playing the diﬀerent strategies. As before, we assume
that if the entrant is given the opportunity to enter (which occurs with probability 1-ε),
there is entry if and only if Π > 0. Then, playing i) gives zero profits with probability (1-ε)
and positive profit with probability ε. Playing ii) gives negative profits with probability ε,
and non-positive profits with probability (1-ε), and playing iii) gives zero profits if there
is no entry, and at most zero profits if there is entry, so ii) and iii) are dominated by i).
Hence we can restrict attention to showing that i) gives a higher payoﬀ than iv), for ε
suﬃciently low.
Playing iv) gives a (positive) profit ΠM with probability ε and a (possibly negative)
profit ΠD with probability 1-ε. We wish to show that for suﬃciently low ε,
εΠ > εΠM + (1− ε)ΠD(B1)
A suﬃcient condition for the inequality to hold is ΠD negative. Suppose that entry takes
place, and that the entrant makes a non-negative profit. Since the proposed equilibrium
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maximizes joint profits, which equals zero, the first certifier must then make negative
profits after entry, and hence ΠD is negative. We have hence shown that the proposed
equilibrium survives the refinement. Notice that, under the refinement there does not
exist equilibria with less than two certifiers entering. The only other equilibrium that
survives the refinement is the symmetric equilibrium with two certifiers entering, which
both choose I = 0 and P = 1
2
. Which of these two equilibria will be played depends on
the beliefs of the first entering certifier about the behavior of the second certifier. For
example, the first certifier may believe that setting I = 0 and P = 1
2
induces the second
entering certifier to set I = 0 and P = .35, in which case the proposed equilibrium will
be played.
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